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CONTEXT AND COMPLIANCE: A
COMPARISON OF STATE SUPREME
COURTS AND THE CIRCUITS
SARA C. BENESH*
WENDY L. MARTINEK**
A host of scholars have argued that decision making in lower courts is at
least partially determined by decision making in the U.S. Supreme Court. In
other words, Supreme Court jurisprudence in a given area influences the way
that the lower courts decide similar cases. 1 This may seem like an
* University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, sbenesh@uwm.edu.
** Binghamton University & National Science Foundation, wemartin@nsf.gov. This Article is
based on a paper originally presented at the Marquette University Law School Criminal Appeals
Conference held June 15–16, 2009. We are indebted to Harold J. Spaeth for his insights on this and
related work. This manuscript reflects the views of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the
views of the National Science Foundation. Wendy Martinek does, however, gratefully acknowledge
the support of the National Science Foundation for the conduct of this research.
1. The literature regarding compliance on the part of inferior courts with superior courts is
voluminous. It is, in fact, too voluminous to catalogue here. Representative examples of this
literature include: SARA C. BENESH, THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE LAW OF CONFESSIONS:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE HIERARCHY OF JUSTICE (2002); BRADLEY C. CANON & CHARLES A.
JOHNSON, JUDICIAL P OLICIES : IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT (2d ed. 1999); FRANK B. CROSS,
DECISION-MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2007); J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY -EIGHT LONELY
MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1961); G. ALAN TARR,
JUDICIAL IMPACT AND STATE SUPREME COURTS (1977); Lawrence Baum, Implementation of
Judicial Decisions: An Organizational Analysis, 4 AM. POL. Q. 86 (1976); Lawrence Baum, Lower
Court Response to Supreme Court Decisions: Reconsidering a Negative Picture, 3 JUST. SYS. J. 208
(1978); Lawrence Baum, Responses of Federal District Judges to Court of Appeals Policies: An
Exploration, 33 W. POL. Q. 217 (1980); Jerry K. Beatty, State Court Evasion of United States
Supreme Court Mandates During the Last Decade of the Warren Court, 6 VAL. U. L. REV. 260
(1972); Edward N. Beiser, A Comparative Analysis of State and Federal Judicial Behavior: The
Reapportionment Cases, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 788 (1968); Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick,
Overruled: An Event History Analysis of Lower Court Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of
Precedent, 64 J. POL. 534 (2002); James Brent, A Principal-Agent Analysis of U.S. Courts of Appeals
Responses to Boerne v. Flores, 31 AM. P OL. RES. 557 (2003); James C. Brent, An Agent and Two
Principals: U.S. Court of Appeals Responses to Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 27 AM. POL. Q. 236 (1999); Evan H.
Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817
(1994); Bradley C. Canon, Reactions of State Supreme Courts to a U.S. Supreme Court Civil
Liberties Decision, 8 L. & SOC. REV. 109 (1973); Bradley C. Canon & Kenneth Kolson, Rural
Compliance with Gault: Kentucky, a Case Study, 10 J. FAM. L. 300 (1971); Pamela C. Corley,
Uncertain Precedent: Circuit Court Responses to Supreme Court Plurality Opinions, 37 AM. POL.
RES. 30 (2009); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998); Tracey E.
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unremarkable assertion given the principle of stare decisis and the expectation
that lower courts are bound by decisions made by higher courts.2
Nonetheless, there are intriguing evidentiary omissions with regard to what
we know about compliance with Supreme Court precedent. In particular,
despite the voluminous expenditures of scholarly time and attention, we do
not know how the High Court’s influence on the federal circuit courts
compares with its influence on the state courts of last resort.3
We might well assume that the Supreme Court has far greater impact on
the U.S. Courts of Appeals since those courts are more closely constrained to
follow Supreme Court precedent by virtue of their position in the federal
judicial system. In contrast, state courts of last resort are not direct members
of the federal judicial system and are therefore more divorced from Supreme
Court influence. Further, while we know that the Supreme Court hears very
few cases from the federal courts of appeals, it hears an even smaller
percentage of cases most recently decided by the state supreme courts. 4 It
George & Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States Courts of Appeals
En Banc, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 171 (2001); John Gruhl, The Supreme Court’s Impact on the Law of
Libel: Compliance by Lower Federal Courts, 33 W. POL. Q. 502 (1980); Charles A. Johnson, Lower
Court Reactions to Supreme Court Decisions: A Quantitative Examination, 23 AM. J. P OL. SCI. 792
(1979); Charles A. Johnson, Law, Politics, and Judicial Decision-making: Lower Federal Court Uses
of Supreme Court Decisions, 21 L. & SOC. REV. 325 (1987); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by a
Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy and Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
1605 (1995); Jennifer K. Luse et al., ―Such Inferior Courts . . . ‖: Compliance by Circuits with
Jurisprudential Regimes, 37 AM. POL. RES. 75 (2009); Kirk A. Randazzo, Strategic Anticipation and
the Hierarchy of Justice in U.S. District Courts, 36 AM. P OL. RES. 669 (2008); Traciel V. Reid,
Judicial Policy-Making and Implementation: An Empirical Examination, 41 W. POL. Q. 509 (1988);
Donald R. Songer, The Impact of the Supreme Court on Trends in Economic Policy Making in the
United States Courts of Appeals, 49 J. POL. 830 (1987); Donald R. Songer et al., Do Judges Follow
the Law when There Is No Fear of Reversal?, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 137 (2003); Donald R. Songer et al.,
The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court–Circuit Court
Interactions, 38 AM. J. P OL. SCI. 673 (1994); Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Supreme
Court Impact on Compliance and Outcomes: Miranda and New York Times in the United States
Courts of Appeals, 43 W. POL. Q. 297 (1990).
2. As the Supreme Court has asserted, stare decisis ―is a basic self-governing principle within
the Judicial Branch.‖ Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989).
3. Most states have reserved the term ―supreme court‖ for their highest courts and, accordingly,
here we use that term interchangeably with ―state court of last resort‖ and ―state high court.‖ We
recognize, however, that there are notable exceptions (e.g., the state of New York, which uses
―supreme court‖ to refer to its major trial courts and ―court of appeals‖ as the appellation for its
highest court).
4. During the 2007 term, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court took some action on 244 cases
appealed from the federal courts, while it took action on only 22 from the state courts. By action, we
include full opinions and memorandum orders. Looking only to full opinions, the difference is even
more stark: The Court reversed twenty-six cases from the circuit or district courts, vacated eleven,
and affirmed twenty, for a total of fifty-seven cases fully considered. In comparison, it reversed a
paltry six from the states, vacated a mere three, and affirmed only an additional three for a total of
twelve cases fully considered. See The Supreme Court 2007 Term—The Statistics, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 516, 525 tbl.II(E) (2008).
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seems, therefore, that the motivation to abide by Supreme Court rulings is
dramatically reduced in the state courts and, accordingly, that a reasonable
expectation is that Supreme Court precedent will fare worse in structuring
decision making on state courts in comparison to decisions on the federal
circuit courts.5
Contrary to these expectations, however, Martinek found that state court
decisions actually do comport closely with Supreme Court policy in the area
of search and seizure. 6 In fact, Martinek found that the state supreme courts
decide their cases in greater accord with High Court prescriptions than do the
federal circuit courts.7 Benesh and Martinek’s findings are also suggestive in
the area of confession, the area of law we consider in this Article. 8 They
found that state high courts are influenced by Supreme Court policy, even
after controlling for the influence state elites (who are instrumental in staffing
the bench) have on these courts.9 They characterize this influence as a legal
one, rather than one driven by a fear of reversal, because only those facts the
Court deemed relevant to the decision whether to admit a given confession
were significant, while the ideological predisposition of the Supreme Court,
which a lower court looking to avoid reversal would consider, was not. 10
Motivated by these somewhat counterintuitive findings, we suggest an
additional comparative analysis of Supreme Court impact on state and lower
federal courts.
Here, we undertake a systematic comparison of decision making in state
supreme courts and the U.S. courts of appeals in the area of criminal
confessions. Prior work has demonstrated that the Supreme Court does
indeed influence the federal courts of appeals in this area of law. 11 We
provide additional evidence that all lower courts are constrained and that the
5. Though the U.S. circuit courts were abolished in 1912, the term ―circuit court‖ remains in
colloquial use to refer to the U.S. courts of appeals, which were created by the Judiciary Act of 1891.
See ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (repealed 1912); Judicial Code of 1912, ch. 13, § 289, 36 Stat. 1167
(1911). We use ―U.S. courts of appeals,‖ ―courts of appeals,‖ and ―circuit courts‖ interchangeably
herein.
6. Wendy L. Martinek, Judicial Impact: The Relationship Between the United States Supreme
Court and State Courts of Last Resort in Search and Seizure Decision -Making 88 (2000)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University) (on file with authors). See also Valerie
Hoekstra, Competing Constraints: State Court Responses to Supreme Court Decisions and
Legislation on Wages and Hours, 58 POL. RES. Q. 317, 320 (2005), for an analysis of the influence of
Supreme Court decisions regarding minimum wage law on state supreme court behavior.
7. Martinek, supra note 6, at 89.
8. Sara C. Benesh & Wendy L. Martinek, State Supreme Court Decision-Making in Confession
Cases, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 109, 110, 125 (2002).
9. Id. at 125.
10. Id.; see also David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of
Lower Court Compliance, 37 L. & SOC. REV. 579, 579, 582 (2003).
11. BENESH, supra note 1.
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influence of the Supreme Court is seen throughout the lower courts, be they
state or federal courts, and without regard to the fact that the High Court
appears to do little to induce that compliance.
Further, an increasing number of decisions emanating from both state and
federal lower courts are final. If one type of court—state high court or federal
intermediate appellate court—more closely adheres to Supreme Court
precedent than another, there are important ramifications for due process.
Certainly, it is unremarkable to note that there are regional differences across
the country—the federal nature of American government is both a product of
and a reflection of this fact.12 And it is also unremarkable to observe that
these differences most likely manifest themselves in the policy making of
various branches and levels of government. But the Supreme Court is
charged with interpreting the Constitution for the entire nation, and its
interpretation of the rights afforded to the accused in terms of representation
and self-incrimination, which the Court has confirmed are constitutionally
based, 13 must be effectuated in all criminal systems, not just in the one for
which it is naturally the apex (i.e., the federal system). If Supreme Court
decisions did not matter to the state supreme courts, there would be myriad
cases decided in the legal systems of this country every day that may be
inconsistent with (or perhaps downright abhorrent to) Supreme Court policy.
Because the High Court is the final arbiter of the Constitution, surely we
expect some attention to be paid to it by the state courts. Just how much
attention, and how that attention compares with the attention paid by the U.S.
courts of appeals, is the question of interest in this Article.
I. THE INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT
To understand the relationship between higher and lower courts, scholars
have frequently utilized one of two theories: principal–agent theory14 or team
theory. 15 For our purposes here, the distinction matters little. Each theoretical
perspective assumes that Supreme Court precedent matters. While some
12. The geographic organization of the courts of appeals suggests a sensitivity t o regional
influence as well. See RICHARD J. RICHARDSON & KENNETH N. VINES, THE P OLITICS OF FEDERAL
COURTS 21 (1970). Further, though these courts are charged with interpreting and applying the same
federal law, ―[t]he task to which the courts of appeals have called themselves is that of making the
national law as applied to their geographical territories.‖ Paul D. Carrington, The Obsolescence of
the United States Courts of Appeals: Roscoe Pound’s Structural Solution, 15 J.L. & POL. 515, 517
(1999).
13. See Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000).
14. See, e.g., Songer et al., The Hierarchy of Justice, supra note 1.
15. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 1612–13; Chad Westerland et al., Lower Court
Defiance of (Compliance with) the U.S. Supreme Court (Apr. 9, 2006) (unpublished paper, presented
at the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=929018.
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scholars argue that the Supreme Court, as an institution, really has very little
impact and cannot single-handedly change the direction of any given policy, 16
the extant evidence demonstrates that the lower courts do pay at least some
heed to the Supreme Court. Whether we say that a lower court does so
because it is acting as an ―agent‖ of its ―principal‖ or because it is acting as a
―member‖ of a ―team‖ is immaterial for our purposes here. What matters is
that the Supreme Court is posited, in each theory, to have some influence over
decisions by the lower courts.
Baum offers yet another way to understand the role the Supreme Court’s
precedent may play in lower court decision making. In particular, Baum
urges scholars to take into account the effect of audiences on judicial
behavior.17 While he considers personal audiences to be most influential, he
also discusses the effect that other (more instrumental) audiences have on
judicial behavior, including those responsible for a judge’s tenure and a
judge’s colleagues on the bench.18 Indeed, in discussing the idea of intracourt influences, Baum suggests that the desire to be perceived as a good
judge may influence that jurist to, for example, hew more closely to
precedent. The logic is that the quality of legal interpretation, arguably
enhanced by citation of Supreme Court precedent, will determine whether
judges’ colleagues will see them as good judges. 19 Principal–agent theory
discusses this idea as one of ―standard operating procedures,‖ whereby agents
influence one another to behave in certain ways—here, to faithfully
implement precedent. 20 In team theory, the discussion focuses on judges
attempting to arrive at the ―correct‖ decision, which is most cheaply obtained
by complying with vertical precedent as handed down by a resource-rich
group of experts that are on the team—namely, the Supreme Court.21
Regardless of the motivation, we expect lower courts to consider and
apply Supreme Court precedent, but we also expect context to matter. There

16. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE : CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008).
17. LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES : A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR, at xi (2006).
18. Id. at 113. See also Cross & Tiller, supra note 1, at 2159. As a point of contrast, see
Virginia A. Hettinger et al., Comparing Attitudinal and Strategic Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 48 AM. J. P OL. SCI. 123 (2004).
19. BAUM, supra note 17, at 54, 113.
20. See JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE:
BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSE TO A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC 50 (1997).
21. See Westerland et al., supra note 15, at 2–4. In economic terms, the efficiency of following
precedent to arrive at the ―right‖ outcome is enhanced when that precedent has been ―solidified in a
long line of decisions . . . . The rule then represents the accumulated experience of many judges
responding to the arguments and evidence of many lawyers . . . .‖ William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 250 (1976).
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are, as noted earlier, several reasons why one might expect a higher level of
compliance from the U.S. courts of appeals than from the state courts of last
resort. The first is the technical distinction over High Court jurisdiction and
the fact that the state supreme courts are not a direct part of the federal court
system. More specifically, it is only when what is at issue is a question of
federal law or federal constitutional interpretation that the U.S. Supreme
Court is formally the final arbiter and state supreme courts are considered
bound by the applicable rulings of the nation’s highest court.
The Supreme Court (via Justice Sandra Day O’Connor) made a strong
statement to this effect in its decision in Michigan v. Long:
It is precisely because of this respect for state courts, and this
desire to avoid advisory opinions, that we do not wish to
continue to decide issues of state law that go beyond the
opinion that we review, or to require state courts to
reconsider cases to clarify the grounds of their decisions.
Accordingly, when, as in this case, a state court decision
fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be
interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and
independence of any possible state law ground is not clear
from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most
reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case
the way it did because it believed that federal law required it
to do so. 22
Obviously then, state supreme court judges can avoid Supreme Court
precedent by basing their rulings on their own state constitutions or the
precedent of their own courts, something that is unavailable to court of
appeals jurists. In addition, the latter are supposed to have a greater level of
professionalism due to their inclusion in the federal judiciary and,
accordingly, might be expected to consider more carefully the rulings of their
constitutionally proscribed superior.23 The state supreme courts, however,
may be inclined to separate themselves from the federal system, thereby
strengthening their position as major players in their respective state
governments.24
22. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040–41 (1983).
23. Canon, supra note 1; Gruhl, supra note 1; see Walter F. Murphy, Lower Court Checks on
Supreme Court Power, 53 AM. P OL. SCI. REV. 1017, 1022 (1959).
24. Indeed, Haas’s comparative study of U.S. court of appeals and state supreme court
treatment of Supreme Court rulings in the area of prisoners’ rights found greater congruence between
the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals in decision direction than between state supreme courts
and the High Court. Kenneth C. Haas, The ―New Federalism‖ and Prisoners’ Rights: State Supreme
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Perhaps more than the relative position of the U.S. courts of appeals in the
American judicial hierarchy, the milieu within which state supreme courts
operate provides ample reason to expect less faithfulness on the part of the
state supreme courts than is manifested in the lower federal courts. Simply
put, while a focus on the vertical relationship between the Supreme Court and
the lower federal courts makes sense in light of the fact that they are operating
within a single legal code and as part of a unified judicial system, such a
singular focus in studying state supreme courts is untenable given the array of
local forces with which state supreme courts must contend. State supreme
courts are not only part of the American judicial system, they are constituent
parts of individual state political systems as well. In other words, ―[U]nlike
judges in lower federal courts, state supreme courts are also embedded in state
political environments that include other actors with the ability to influence
their decisions.‖25 We might then expect that the state courts ignore (or
evade) Supreme Court policy (when they disagree with it or when their
agreement is insufficient) more often than the federal circuit courts. State
courts simply have more important things with which to deal. They have
other audiences to consider; they have multiple principals to satisfy; they are
not an explicit part of the team. Even agreement with the Supreme Court’s
policy prescriptions may not be sufficient to compel these courts to comply,
given that they must also consider other actors’ reactions to their compliance.
If we consider Baum’s idea of audiences,26 it becomes clear that the state
supreme court judges are in a far more delicate situation. To be sure, they
have a judicial audience and likely care what the federal courts think of their
decisions in matters concerning federal law. However, they also have more
direct audiences to consider: the voters or legislators (depending on the
system of judicial retention) who determine whether they retain their position,
and members of the state bar (who likely reflect the ideology of state elites)
who will digest, utilize, and evaluate their decisions. In short, audiences for
members of state supreme courts are varied, and ties to the federal judiciary
may well seem remote by comparison. In the parlance of principal–agent
theory, there are ―multiple principals‖ to whom state high court judges are
beholden, including the U.S. Supreme Court in matters of federal law, but also
those responsible for the continued tenure of the judges of the court, including
the public when the judges are elected and state elites when the judges are
appointed. Their faithfulness to one set of principals may spell unfaithfulness
to others. In terms of team theory, judges on state high courts simply may not

Courts in Comparative Perspective, 34 W. POL. Q. 552, 560–69 (1981).
25. Scott A. Comparato & Scott D. McClurg, A Neo-Institutional Explanation of State Supreme
Court Responses in Search and Seizure Cases, 35 AM. POL. RES. 726, 729 (2007).
26. BAUM, supra note 17.
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see themselves as members of the federal judiciary, and thus their attempts at
maximizing their organizational effectiveness may not include consideration
of what federal courts are doing, but rather focus on how best to organize their
own court systems.
II. THE CONFESSION CASES
These ideas about the differential strength of Supreme Court precedent in
models of decision making in the states versus decision making in the circuits
are tested in this Article via the use of two existing datasets that code cases
involving confessions. These cases fit the type of analysis to be employed
here for several reasons. First, they are controversial cases involving the
rights of the criminally accused, arguably a type of case that draws attention
from several different sectors. Second, in this area of law, the Supreme Court
itself has indicated that differences of fact should matter to the resolution of
the case; hence, measuring Supreme Court precedent is more easily
accomplished by coding for factual circumstances the Court has deemed
relevant to the admission of a confession (e.g., whether Miranda rights were
read, whether the accused was brought promptly before a magistrate, whether
the accused was young, etc.).27 In choosing this area of law, then, we are able
to determine whether the facts indicated by the High Court as important
factors in the determination of the voluntariness of a confession are the same
facts considered by lower courts. In addition, this area of the law is useful for
this type of analysis because there were changes over time in Supreme Court
doctrine. Presuming that lower courts are attentive to the Supreme Court,
they should move in a liberal direction (toward Miranda’s protective stance),
as the Supreme Court did, and then in a conservative direction (away from
Miranda) as the Court has done in creating numerous exceptions to Miranda’s
proscriptions.
This allows for a test of responsiveness as well as
congruence. 28 Third, this set of cases is relevant to the states as well as to the
federal courts, because both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the
Constitution are binding on state governments as well as the federal
government.29 And finally, though our dataset does not extend to the present,
27. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 517–18 (1963).
28. Responsiveness implies that as the Supreme Court modifies its doctrine, so, too, the lower
court modifies its doctrine in the same direction. Congruence, on the other hand, implies that a lower
court and the Supreme Court, given the same facts, would decide the case in the same way.
Congruence is time-dependent and specific to a given decision, while responsiveness is more a
measure of trends and the propensity of the lower court to follow the Supreme Court ideologically.
The former leaves minimal room for the lower court to exercise discretion (e.g., act in accordance
with attitudinal predilections), while the latter does afford some leeway.
29. The right to counsel was incorporated fully in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–44
(1963), and the protection against self-incrimination was incorporated in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1, 8 (1964).
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this is surely an area of criminal law with which the state and the federal
courts continue to contend, as evidenced most starkly by the Supreme Court’s
recent ruling in Corley v. United States.30
To measure precedent by identifying relevant case facts in confession
cases, we draw on Benesh,31 who applied a fact pattern model of confession
cases to the U.S. courts of appeals, demonstrating the federal intermediate
appellate courts’ attention to the Supreme Court in this area of the law. In the
next Part, we briefly recap what Benesh found and then discuss the
application of her work to studying the state supreme courts, discussing as
well the operationalization of the additional influences on the state court
discussed above as competing with the Supreme Court’s precedent for
influence. We then explicitly compare decision making in confession cases in
each court. We conclude with a discussion of what this means for the impact
of the Supreme Court in this particular area of criminal law and for the state
of criminal law itself.
III. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT IN CONFESSION CASES
Benesh tested a model of confession cases in the U.S. courts of appeals
and in so doing created a usable set of facts with a prima facie claim to being
related to Supreme Court decision making in the confession cases.32 These
factors fall into three categories: coercion, characteristics of the accused, and
procedural considerations.33 We discuss each in turn and derive our measure
of precedent from this categorization.
First, actual coercion is expected to be an important fact in the
determination of voluntariness. Where coercion is present, manifested either
physically or psychologically, courts will more likely suppress the confession.
Where it is not, courts will be less likely to do so. Forms of coercion, other
than those explicitly physical or psychological, also exist and are coded.
These include deprivation of basic needs (including lack of food or sleep),
length and place of detention, incommunicado detention, whether the

30. 129 S. Ct. 1558 (2009). This case concerned the timely presentment of an accused before a
magistrate, as required by McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943), and Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449, 455 (1957). The Court, in a 5–4 decision, held that an accused must be brought
before a magistrate within six hours of arrest, unless police have an adequate reason for a delay, and
that if he or she is not, any confession obtained before presentment must be excluded from evidence
at trial. 129 S. Ct. at 1571. It is also an area of law that consistently attracts the attention of legal
reformers and non-governmental organizations. See, e.g., NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM.,
JUSTICE DENIED : AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL
(2009); AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S
BROKEN PROMISE : AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2004).
31. BENESH, supra note 1.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 61–62.
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defendant is represented by counsel, and whether the defendant requested an
attorney but was denied by his interrogators. Mitigating factors would serve
to counter any existing coercion.
In addition to these coercive factors, Benesh discusses several
characteristics of the accused that may lead an individual to be more or less
affected by (overtly or subtly) coercive methods. These include mental status,
intelligence, race, experience, youth, legal experience, and some other
miscellaneous characteristics.34 Other miscellaneous characteristics include,
for example, situations in which the detainee is a mother of several small
children, a drug addict, someone with high blood pressure, ill or under the
influence of drugs or alcohol, or very slight of build.
Finally, there are several procedural defects that might taint the
voluntariness of a confession. These include failure to read the Miranda
rights, a lengthy interrogation, a coercive environment for that interrogation,
the use of police relay tactics in questioning, courtroom procedural unfairness
(including, for example, whether the court heard testimony as to voluntariness
outside the presence of the jury), the determination that a given error was
harmless, a confession that was the fruit of some prior illegality (an illegal
arrest or an illegal search found to have induced the confession), and the
failure to bring the defendant before a magistrate without unnecessary delay.
Of course, a knowing and intelligent waiver of the Miranda rights would also
affect the determination of voluntariness.
We measure the influence of these various factors by considering them to
be facts to be balanced by the lower courts in the three above-discussed
categories. Hence, the lower court will determine whether, considering those
aspects that weigh against admitting a challenged confession against those
that weigh in favor of admitting a challenged confession, the confession in
question was coerced, the defendant’s will was overborne, or the arrest and
trial were conducted in accordance with fair procedures. In other words, we
expect the lower courts to consider all factors relevant to the Supreme Court’s
decisions over time as a sort of running tally of those factors favorable to an
accused’s challenge of the admission of his confession and those that run
against it. So, for example, if the accused was not read her rights and was
young, but she did volunteer some statements, the lower court will be less
likely to exclude her confession than if she did not volunteer the statements.
Likewise, the claims of an accused who was taken before a magistrate and
read his rights will be treated differently from those of an accused who was

34. These characteristics (and others) are posited to affect the level of coercion likely to have
been present during the interrogation. All affect the will of the accused to overcome such coercion.
Id. For an informative discussion of the psychological mechanisms leading to these effects, see Saul
M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confessions, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 193, 203–06 (2008).
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only read his rights.
Accordingly, we create three variables to measure the weight of precedent
in each case: one to take into account the balance of coercion (the number of
factors that showed coercion less the number that showed a lack of coercion),
one to measure the characteristics of the accused (the number of factors that
would indicate vulnerability less the number that would indicate the ability to
withstand pressure), and one to measure the procedures employed in the case
(the number of factors that indicate problematic procedures less the number of
procedural safeguards at issue in the case). All three of these variables are
coded such that positive values are expected to enhance the likelihood that a
confession will be excluded, and negative values are expected to decrease that
likelihood (that is, are expected to increase the likelihood that a confession
will be admitted).
In addition to these three key variables, we also measure change in
precedent within the time frame under investigation. Both principal–agent
and team theory accounts would suggest that a lower court heeds a change in
policy and pays attention to the current policy preferences of the Supreme
Court in making its decisions. A concern with audience would also suggest
that a lower court judge should take note of changing circumstances with
respect to Supreme Court preferences. Hence, as the Supreme Court becomes
more conservative, we would expect the lower courts to be more likely to
admit a challenged confession, especially as the Court makes exceptions to
the central holding of Miranda.
During the time frame under investigation in this Article, the Court
decided that it was acceptable to use un-Mirandized statements to impeach
testimony should the accused decide to testify, even though such statements
could not be introduced as evidence of guilt. 35 The Court also determined that
evidence obtained from witnesses brought to light via an unwarned statement
was still admissible, even though the police would not have known of the
witness but for the accused’s statement (which was not preceded by the
Miranda warnings).36 The Court also permitted the admission of statements
taken from an accused who had earlier invoked his right to silence because
both interrogations were preceded by Miranda warnings and were separated
by a substantial time lapse.37 All of these cases would lead an attentive lower
court to believe that the Court was moving away from a strict adherence to
Miranda, and so may have affected the propensity of the lower courts to

35.
36.
37.
Miranda
analysis.

Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225–26 (1971).
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 435, 451–52 (1974).
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104–06, 107 (1975). The Court further retreated from
subsequently, but as our analysis ends at 1981, no other exceptions are relevant to this
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exclude confessions. Accordingly, we include a variable that increases as the
Court makes accommodations for the use of uncounseled statements. It starts
at 0, increases to 1 in 1971, to 2 in 1974, and to 3 in 1975. We expect this
variable to be negatively signed; that is, as the Supreme Court moves away
from Miranda, confessions will be less likely to be excluded by lower courts.
We also include a measure of Supreme Court ideology to account for the
possibility that the lower courts use Court ideology as either a proxy for the
direction of the law, giving the lower court the ability to anticipate these
shifts, or as an indicator of the likelihood that a given decision will be
reversed, which we assume judges avoid when possible. We measure this
variable as the mean Segal and Cover score for the Supreme Court in the year
of the lower court’s decision. 38
IV. SELECTING CASES
To compare the effects of Supreme Court precedent on the two different
sets of lower courts, we use data collected by Benesh for the circuits and data
collected by Benesh and Martinek for the state supreme courts. 39 To define
the universe of cases for both the circuit courts and the state supreme courts,
both sources used West’s Key Number System and the Decennial Digest,
considering cases under keys 516 through 538 and decided between 1970 and
1981. These keys are under the larger subject of ―Criminal Law,‖ under the
heading ―Evidence,‖ and the subheading ―Confessions.‖ Given West’s
reputation, this listing should be considered exhaustive, as well as validly and
reliably constructed. Any omitted cases are assumed to have no systematic
fact patterns.40 Because of the large number of cases produced at the state
38. Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme
Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 560 (1989). The authors coded newspaper editorials in
both liberally slanted and conservatively slanted outlets for mentions of a given Supreme Court
nominee’s ideological predisposition. Id. at 559. Their measure is the percentage of paragraphs in
which the nominee is discussed that suggest he or she is liberal. Id. This is the standard measure
employed by political scientists studying the Supreme Court, and numerous studies have
demonstrated that this measure has a strong relationship with the voting behavior of the justices. See,
e.g., Richard C. Kearney & Reginald S. Sheehan, Supreme Court Decision-Making: The Impact of
Court Composition on State and Local Government Litigation, 54 J. POL. 1008 (1992); William
Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution? The
Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87, 90 (1993);
Reginald S. Sheehan et al., Ideology, Status, and the Differential Success of Direct Parties Before the
Supreme Court, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 464, 465 (1992). See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn,
Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953 –
1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 136 (2002), for a discussion of another common measure of the
ideology of Supreme Court justices (albeit one with issues of endogeneity).
39. BENESH, supra note 1, considered the universe of confession cases from 1949 to 1981.
Benesh & Martinek, supra note 8, at 110, considered a sample of confession cases from 1970 to
1991. We use the overlapping years, 1970–1981, in this analysis.
40. This is important for the purposes of inference because, assuming that omitted cases are
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court level using this procedure, the state cases are a sample, stratified by
state. All cases were coded trichotomously as follows: whether the fact is (1)
mentioned as present; (2) mentioned as not present; or (3) not mentioned at
all. This allows for an investigation of whether the mention that a factor is not
present balances the fact that another is present. In turn, this allows us to
measure the effect of precedent as the difference between the number of
factors leading to a constitutional infirmity versus the number negating any
such constitutional infirmity. We compare the results of a logit estimation of
a model of circuit court decision making to results of a model estimating state
supreme court decision making to ascertain whether one lower court is more
sensitive to Supreme Court precedent. 41 Due to the variations in the
institutional situations of the various state supreme courts and previous
findings demonstrating the importance of several contextual and institutional
factors on decision making, we also take into account additional contextual
considerations, as detailed in the next section.
V. COMPARABILITY OF THE CASES
Before turning to the additional variables considered in modeling state
supreme court decision making, we note that, given the multiple principals
and audiences discussed above, an argument might be made that decisions
rendered at the Supreme Court level and those made at the circuit or state
supreme court level cannot be fairly compared. After all, the Supreme Court
has total docket control, the circuits have basically none, and state courts of
last resort vary on this dimension. However, we find, in looking at the
number of factors considered in each case, that the cases look a lot alike. As
seen in Tables 1–3, all three levels of courts consider cases with more than
five factors at issue, and all three consider cases with warnings, coercion, and
procedural issues more often than cases with other facts mentioned as
relevant. This gives us a stronger basis on which to consider the differential
effects of the various facts on decision making in both courts. In short, each
court appears to be dealing with confession cases that are, if not identical, at
least comparable.
VI. PUTTING STATE SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT
As noted previously, any rigorous analysis requires that we consider the
complex situation in which judges on the state courts operate. The judges on
state high courts certainly must deal with and apply Supreme Court precedent.
random with regard to the fact patterns they contain, there will be no effect on the parameter
estimates obtained in the statistical analysis.
41. See JOHN H. ALDRICH & FORREST D. NELSON, LINEAR P ROBABILITY, LOGIT, AND PROBIT
MODELS 48, 65–66 (1984), for an accessible treatment of logit as a statistical estimator.
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However, they also make decisions in a context that suggests further
influences on their decisions. While most scholars agree that attitudes play
some role in the decision making of courts,42 law and courts scholars also
recognize that ―any attempt to explain behavior with reference to beliefs but
not to contexts such as institutional settings will inevitably be incomplete,‖
because contextual factors make enacting policy preferences either more or
less difficult, and may even create certain goals and preferences related to the
institution itself. 43 This role for context ―means that the justices’ behavior
might be motivated not only by a calculation about prevailing opportunities
and risks but also by a sense of duty or obligation about their responsibilities
to the law and the Constitution and by commitment to act as judges rather
than as legislators or executives.‖ 44 These notions, put forward by ―new
institutionalists‖45 in political science, seem especially applicable to the
situation in which the judges of the state courts of last resort find themselves.
Members of state supreme court benches, no less than U.S. Supreme
Court justices, have their own ideological and policy preferences, and would
likely wish to advance them in their decision making, given the appropriate
42. The influence of judges’ attitudes on their decision making has been carefully documented.
The seminal work with regard to the influence of attitudes on decision making by the U.S. Supreme
Court is C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL P OLITICS AND
VALUES 1937–1947 (1948). The voluminous subsequent work taking up this theme includes P AUL
M. COLLINS, JR., FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT : INTEREST GROUPS AND JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING (2008); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ATTITUDINAL M ODEL REVISITED (2002). Evidence as to the utility of judicial attitudes for
understanding the choices judges of other courts make is also ubiquitous. For representative
examples, see VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER ET AL., JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT : INFLUENCES ON
FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION -MAKING (2006); Micheal W. Giles et al., Research Note, Picking
Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623 (2001);
Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1961–1964, 60 AM. P OL.
SCI. REV. 374 (1966); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals Revisited,
69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 491 (1975). But see Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of
Empirical Studies that Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking , 58
DUKE L.J. 1895 (2009). Debate continues unabated about the relative influence of attitudinal
considerations vis-à-vis legal considerations.
43. Howard Gillman & Cornell W. Clayton, Beyond Judicial Attitudes: Institutional
Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION -MAKING: NEW
INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 1, 3–4 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
44. Id. at 5.
45. The term ―new‖ included in the new institutionalist moniker is intended to distinguish these
institutional scholars from previous institutional scholars who focused solely on the analysis of
formal institutional structures and rules. See James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New
Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 734 (1984).
The new institutionalism emerged in response to the ascendancy of the behavioral revolution and its
exclusive focus on individuals and their behavior without regard for the context within which
individuals behave. See Robert A. Dahl, The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for
a Monument to a Successful Protest, 55 AM. P OL. SCI. REV. 763 (1961).
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opportunity. In addition, each state supreme court functions within its own
unique environment in terms of the politics of its coordinate branches and the
state in general. Further, there are institutional differences among state courts
of last resort that are likely to affect the salience of these various influences.
The literature is replete with examples of scholarship demonstrating the
importance of understanding context to understand judicial behavior in state
courts.46 Little of it, however, explicitly tests the importance of context to
determine the faithfulness of lower courts to superior courts. 47 Here we
consider how the system by which judges are retained in office, the political
environment, the legal institutional design, and the policy preferences of the
judges on the state courts of last resort compete with Supreme Court
precedent to explain the decision making of state supreme courts in
confession cases.
A. Judicial Retention and Political Environment
State supreme court jurists ascend to their positions through a variety of
appointive and elective mechanisms. 48 Regardless of the mechanism,
dominant political values in the state come into play. Scholars have
unequivocally demonstrated that elected judges display a definite sensitivity
to their constituencies’ preferences. 49 Judges who must face the electorate to
remain in office have every incentive to avoid making decisions that can
provide fodder for electoral opponents. There has been a special focus in the
extant literature on death penalty decisions,50 but there is no reason to suspect
46. See Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Studying Courts Comparatively: The View from the
American States, 48 POL. RES. Q. 5, 7, 12 (1995); Craig F. Emmert & Carol Ann Traut, The
California Supreme Court and the Death Penalty, 22 AM. POL. Q. 41, 43, 58 (1994); Gregory N.
Flemming et al., An Integrated Model of Privacy Decision-Making in State Supreme Courts, 26 AM.
POL. Q. 35, 40–41 (1998).
47. A notable exception is Comparato & McClurg, supra note 25, at 727–29.
48. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV ’TS, 40 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 277–78 (2008). To illustrate,
judges (including incumbents) on the Alabama Supreme Court are selected in non-partisan elections
every six years, while judges (including incumbents) on the Oregon Supreme Court are selected by
the court every six years. Id. South Carolina, in contrast, relies on legislative appointment (and
reappointment) for the selection of its high court judges, while members of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court are appointed by the governor from the Judicial Nominating Commission for life
terms. Id. Complete information as to the method of judicial selection and retention in the states is
available from THE BOOK OF THE STATES. In addition, the American Judicature Society maintains
an easy-to-use online tool to locate judicial selection and retention information. Am. Judicature
Soc’y, Judicial Selection Methods in the States, http://www.ajs.org/selection/sel_state-select-map.asp
(last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
49. See, e.g., Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme
Courts, 54 J. POL. 427, 428 (1992); Melinda Gann Hall & Paul Brace, Justices’ Responses to Case
Facts: An Interactive Model, 24 AM. P OL. Q. 237, 242 (1996).
50. See, e.g., Carol Ann Traut & Craig F. Emmert, Expanding the Integrated Model of Judicial
Decision-Making: The California Justices and Capital Punishment, 60 J. POL. 1166, 1166–67
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that the lessons learned will not travel to other areas of criminal jurisprudence.
For example, search-and-seizure decision making has been found to be
influenced by such considerations, 51 and we contend that confession cases are
likely to be influenced as well.
We expect that state supreme court judges retained via elections should be
more likely to uphold a challenged confession as the electorate becomes more
conservative, ceteris paribus. The logic is simple: such judges are likely to
wish to avoid being seen as soft on crime. To measure electorate preferences,
we utilize Berry et al.’s measure of citizenry ideology, which relies upon
interest group ratings and ranges from zero (most conservative) to one (most
liberal). 52 Similarly, if state high court judges are strategic (which the extant
evidence suggests they are),53 there is reason to believe that when appointed
judges act, they are likely to keep in mind the preferences of the political
elites responsible for their accession to—and retention on—the bench.
Indeed, in a recent analysis, Langer found that members of state supreme
court benches do show concern for retaliation by other state political actors
(the legislature and governor), as manifested by a lessened propensity to
engage in judicial review, for at least some areas of law. 54 We similarly argue
that justices will take ideology into account when deciding confession cases,
basing their decisions to suppress confessions, in part, on the ideology of
those responsible for their retention. 55 For judges who are retained by one of
the branches of government or who serve life terms after being appointed by
one or some combination of both of the other governmental branches, we
expect that the referent for judges considering their environment will be the
prevailing ideology in the coordinate branches. Berry et al. have a measure
comparable to their citizen ideology measure that considers the ideology of

(1998).
51. Martinek, supra note 6, at 40–42.
52. In constructing their measure of citizen ideology for each state for each year from 1960 to
1993, William Berry and his colleagues began with interest group ratings for each member of
Congress. See William D. Berry et al., Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American
States, 1960–93, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 327 (1998). Using those interest group ratings to locate
congressmen in ideological space, they proceeded to estimate citizen ideology in each congressional
district as a function of the ideology score for the incumbent congressman in the district, the
estimated ideology score for a challenger (or hypothetical challenger to the incumbent), and the
election results (to take into account the ideological divisions in the electorate). Id. at 330–31. To
determine state-level citizen ideology, they then aggregated the district-level scores, weighting them
on the basis of each candidate’s share of support in his or her respective district. Id.
53. See, e.g., LAURA LANGER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN STATE SUPREME COURTS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 123 (2002).
54. Id. at 125.
55. We determined method of retention by consulting relevant editions of THE BOOK OF THE
STATES, supra note 48, supplemented as necessary with information obtained from state ―blue
books,‖ state government web sites, and the American Judicature Society.
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state elites, and we use it to approximate state ideology when judges owe their
office, tenure, or both, to those in positions of power in the state
government.56
B. Legal Environment
The new institutionalists have also provided persuasive evidence in
support of the thesis that institutional arrangements matter for judicial outputs.
For example, some state supreme courts are relieved of the burden of a
nondiscretionary docket, or at least have that burden ameliorated; others,
however, must hear every case that comes to them, which lessens their ability
to effectuate policy. We presume that the existence of an intermediate
appellate court and a discretionary (rather than mandatory) criminal
jurisdiction are indicators of at least some freedom from frivolous cases.
When state supreme courts are able to rely upon intermediate appellate courts
to resolve easy cases, they can restrict themselves to more important ones,
providing them with the opportunity to decide more cases in which there may
be a constitutionally defective confession. Having an intermediate appellate
court also reduces the workload for the state supreme court, giving the
members of that court additional room to make policy and take big cases. 57
So, too, discretion with regard to criminal appeals (i.e., a discretionary docket)
allows judges to focus on policy content in selecting the cases they will hear. 58
Therefore, we expect that, ceteris paribus, state supreme courts with an
intermediate appellate court and those with discretionary criminal
jurisdictions will be more likely to overturn challenged confessions. Each of
these conditions are coded dichotomously, i.e., the state either has it (1) or
does not (0).
Also likely to be relevant is a state’s constitution. As one state supreme
court jurist remarked, ―[S]tate charters offer important local protection against
the ebbs and flows of federal constitutional interpretation.‖ 59 In most
instances states have adopted, more or less word for word, the language of the
U.S. Constitution’s Bill of Rights in guaranteeing protection against self56. Berry et al., supra note 52, at 332. The Berry et al. measure of government (or elite)
ideology for each state is based on the ideology scores for the governor and the major party
delegations in each chamber of the state legislature, combined on the basis of specified assumptions
regarding the relative power of the governor, the minority party in each legislative chamber, and the
majority party in each legislative chamber. Id.
57. As with information about methods of selection and retention, information about the
presence or absence of an intermediate appellate court is available in the various editions of THE
BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 48, at 286–88.
58. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS: IMPROVING
CASE PROCESSING, at v–vi (1990), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/
KIS_DiffCMIntAppCts.pdf.
59. People v. Houston, 724 P.2d 1166, 1174 (Cal. 1986).
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incrimination (the protection relevant to confession cases). There are,
however, a few instances in which the language of a state constitution is more
protective of individual rights than the U.S. Constitution and others where it is
less so. 60 Presumably, the language of the state constitution should affect the
decisions a state supreme court jurist can make. When the state constitution
provides more expansive protections than those afforded by the federal
Constitution, it enhances the likelihood that a confession will be invalidated as
involuntary. Conversely, when the state constitution provides less expansive
protections than those afforded by the federal Constitution, the likelihood of
invalidating a confession as involuntary is likely to be diminished. This
variable is coded 0 for a state constitution with no self-incrimination
provision, 1 for one less protective than the federal Constitution, 2 for one
identical to those found in the U.S. Constitution, and 3 for state constitutions
that are more protective of self-incrimination.61 We expect this variable to be
positively related to the exclusion of a challenged confession.
State courts also have the liberty to rely upon independent state grounds in
writing their opinions. We expect that state courts may plausibly avoid the
thrust of U.S. Supreme Court doctrine by resting their decisions on
independent state grounds, as Michigan v. Long made clear they could do. 62
Accordingly, we code each case as to whether (1) or not (0) the decision rests
on independent state grounds.63 We expect this variable to really matter only
in tandem with the variable measuring the protections afforded to the accused
by the state constitution.64 Accordingly, we also include a variable that
measures the interaction: Those state courts operating under more protective
state constitutions are expected to be more likely to exclude a confession
when reliance is placed on state rather than federal grounds than those with
less protective state constitutions.
Considered collectively, these variations in external environment,
institutional features, and legal context allow us to compare the state courts
with the circuit courts in terms of their faithfulness to Supreme Court
precedent, while remaining sensitive to the decision making influences unique
60. For a detailed and informative discussion of constitutional development in the fifty states,
including their convergence with and divergence from the federal Constitution, see generally
G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1998).
61. We obtained information as to the relevant state constitutional provisions by consulting the
various state government web sites.
62. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983).
63. We relied on the language of the state high court opinions themselves to code this variable.
64. In other words, we have no reason to believe that whether a decision rests on independent
state grounds will make a state court more or less likely to admit a challenged confession into
evidence. However, when the state constitution specifically affords greater protection and the state
court decision rests on independent state grounds, the court should be less likely to admit the
challenged confession (i.e., more likely to exclude the challenged confession).
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to the state context.
VII. MODELS OF DECISION MAKING
We seek to test similar models of decision making on a set of cases
decided by the state courts of last resort with one decided by the circuit courts
to ascertain, within a given area of criminal appeals, whether one level of
court is more cognizant of, or compliant with, Supreme Court precedent on
point. Hence, we include the aforementioned measures of Supreme Court
precedent in each model (three measuring confession precedent, one
measuring the ideology of the U.S. Supreme Court, and one taking into
account the cases decided during the period that relaxed Miranda’s
requirements). In addition, we control for murder/manslaughter, expecting
that judges will be less willing to overturn cases involving the most serious of
crimes for reasons relating to how a confession of guilt was obtained. We
also control for the lower court decision, because, at least at the circuit level,
appellate courts are often deferential to the lower trial courts. And, of course,
no model of judicial decision making is complete without attention to
preferences. Currently, the best available measures of state supreme court
judge ideology are the PAJID scores, developed by Hall and Brace. 65 For the
circuit courts, we employ a blunter measure, that of the percentage of any
given panel appointed by a Democratic president. 66

65. Brace and his collaborators develop an individual-level measure of judicial ideology with
the aid of the Berry et al. citizen and government ideology measures discussed before. See supra
notes 52, 56. Specifically, for appointed judges, Brace et al. use the government ideology score at
the time of a judge’s appointment as that judge’s ideology score, weighted by the party affiliation of
the judge. Paul Brace et al., Measuring the Preferences of State Supreme Court Judges, 62 J. POL.
387, 396–97 (2000). For elected judges, Brace et al. use the citizen ideology score at the time of a
judge’s election as that judge’s ideology score, weighted by the party affiliation of the judge. Id.
66. Blunt though this measure may be, it reflects the fact that the President nominates court of
appeals judges. Though the Senate has the constitutionally granted prerogative to confirm or reject a
presidential nominee, the Senate may not substitute its own nominee for that of a President. In other
words, when an individual nominated by the President is not confirmed by the Senate, it is the
President who retains the authority to make a subsequent nomination. The evidence with regard to
the utility of the party of the appointing President as a measure of judicial attitudes is extensive. See,
e.g., Donald R. Songer & Susan Haire, Integrating Alternative Approaches to the Study of Judicial
Voting: Obscenity Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. P OL. SCI. 963, 970 (1992); Donald
R. Songer & Sue Davis, The Impact of Party and Region on Voting Decisions in the United States
Courts of Appeals, 1955–1986, 43 W. POL. Q. 317, 319 (1990). See generally Daniel R. Pinello,
Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 242
(1999). For a thorough consideration of the debate over appropriate statistical measures and an
explicit evaluation of the party of the appointing President, see Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise,
Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates About Statistical Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV.
743, 782–83 (2005).
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VIII. ANALYSIS
Tables 4 and 5 present our findings. The former (Table 4) shows the same
model estimated on the basis of state supreme court data and on the basis of
circuit court data; the latter (Table 5) takes into account the contextual
features of decision making by the state supreme courts. As seen in Table 4,
Supreme Court precedent heavily influences both courts in this area.
Measures of precedent in all three categories are signed as predicted, and
highly statistically significant. However, neither court seems particularly
concerned with the Supreme Court’s ideology at the time they are making
their decision, nor are they overly attentive to the changes made in Supreme
Court doctrine over the time period examined. The latter is most likely due to
the short time frame—neither court really had much of an opportunity to
apply the new exceptions, and all three exceptions were somewhat limited in
their nature.
The lack of a significant relationship between the decisions made and the
ideological makeup of the Supreme Court suggests that the lower courts seek
only to apply Supreme Court precedent as they understand it and not to
anticipate the future behavior of the High Court or attempt to avoid its
review. 67 Interestingly, the only other variable significant to the circuit courts
is the decision of the district courts, while the only other significant influence
on state supreme court decision making is their own ideology. This difference
could be due to the difference in docket control enjoyed by the two courts,
through which the circuits are hearing a greater number of easy cases.
Alternatively, this difference could be due to their concomitant difference in
terms of hierarchical level (the state supreme court being the highest in each
system and the circuits being but an intermediate court) or some real
difference between the two in the way that decisions are made. This analysis
cannot distinguish among these options.
This difference, however, largely disappears once we place the state
supreme courts into their proper context, as reported in Table 5. There, we
continue to see a tremendous influence by the Supreme Court’s precedents on
the lower courts’ decisions, with all three direct measures of precedent again
both signed as expected and highly statistically significant. The state supreme
courts, however, do react to their environments, as courts are attentive to the
ideology of the actor responsible for obtaining or retaining their seats (though
the variable just misses conventional levels of significance). Further, state
supreme courts are less likely to exclude a confession from evidence in a
murder case, though this finding obtains a lower significance level than
generally considered to be definitive (p < 0.08). Also at that lower, but still

67. Notably, this comports with interviews one author has conducted with circuit court judges.
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substantial, level of statistical significance is the variable measuring whether
the state enjoys discretionary jurisdiction over criminal appeals. As can be
seen in Table 5, states with greater discretion over their dockets are more
likely to exclude a given confession than states that lack such docket control.
Importantly, this attention to state ideology and the influence of jurisdiction
comes at the expense of the effectuation of their own policy preferences; the
mean PAJID score for the majority in any given case is no longer relevant to
the outcome of the case.
In short, we find the Supreme Court’s precedents to matter to both state
high courts and the federal courts of appeals. To which set of courts is it more
important? Table 6 considers the influence of the Court’s precedent on the
state courts of last resort and on the circuit courts, respectively, as measured
by the change in the probability that a confession will be excluded for various
levels of the independent variables measuring the effects of the factual
considerations deemed relevant by the Supreme Court. As shown in Table 6,
while Supreme Court precedent in all three categories does exert influence on
both courts, the circuit courts seem to be more consistently and strongly
attentive to the Court’s decisions in these cases. While the state courts are
largely influenced by the balance of factors concerning coercion, they are less
sympathetic to characteristics of the accused than the circuit courts. Further,
the state courts are less likely to exclude a confession based upon procedural
defects than the circuits. It is interesting to consider the state courts’ context
when thinking about these results. One could surely make the case that
excluding a confession extracted via some type of coercion is less likely to
garner public disapproval than excluding a confession because of procedural
considerations, or because an accused was somehow more susceptible to
police influence. Interestingly, the state courts change more drastically with
changes in the coercion variable than they do in response to changes in either
of the other two precedent categories. The circuits, on the other hand, behave
differently. They are far more influenced by susceptible defendants than the
states; indeed, the influence of this variable is nearly as strong as the variable
measuring the degree to which the accused was coerced.
IX. CONCLUSION
As is the nature of a common-law system, courts in the United States
subscribe to a view of decision making that includes a large role for the
decisions made by past courts and for decisions made by courts higher in the
judicial hierarchy. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court is the self-declared final
arbiter of the Constitution. It is uncontroversial to suggest, then, that lower
courts ought to be influenced by the decision of courts ―higher‖ than they.
However, that notion does not resolve the issue of Supreme Court impact for
at least two reasons. First, judicial decisions are made by people, not
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machines. That is, judges are individuals whose cognitive processes are not
without vulnerabilities, and those vulnerabilities can lead even judges who are
the most earnest in their commitment to faithful compliance with the Court to
render decisions that are not perfectly compliant. 68 Second, the Supreme
Court expects compliance by all lower courts, including state courts of last
resort, when they decide questions of federal law. After all, the Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause unequivocally asserts that the U.S. Constitution is superior
to any other law, and the Court’s decision in Dickerson v. United States
makes clear that its confession jurisprudence is its interpretation of rights
guaranteed by the Constitution.69 Despite this expectation, however, the
Court is faced with the task of inducing compliance on the part of a
heterogeneous group of courts, and a one-size-fits-all approach is unlikely to
be useful.
In this Article, we have demonstrated that there are notable differences in
the decision making context that lead to differential force of the Supreme
Court’s proclamations in the area of confessions. To be clear, both the federal
courts of appeals and state supreme courts are compliant: The variables
directly measuring Supreme Court precedent are highly significant and
correctly signed in the models of decision making for both sets of courts. But
state courts are evidently slightly less compelled than the circuit courts to
make certain decisions as a consequence of the factual configuration of the
case under consideration. This finding is interesting from the perspective of
empirical theory building. Our objective here was not to engage in strictly
theoretical testing, but rather to uncover systematic differences in compliance
on the part of these two different categories of courts. Our models were
obviously informed by the extant scholarship and, in that sense, were
theoretically motivated. But our findings with regard to compliance on the
part of state and federal lower courts are perhaps most important from the
perspective of normative theory. The Supreme Court has interpreted the
Constitution to forbid the use of confessions that are compelled by coercion
and not preceded by procedural protections in a criminal prosecution. Yet,
while it is likely that the lower courts (both federal and state) will so decide, it
is more likely that the circuits will do so than that the states will do so.
Hence, due process protections (of which protection against coerced
confessions is one) are not uniformly enforced across the judicial system.
68. Commenting more generally about judges’ cognition, Guthrie et al. observe, ―[W]holly
apart from political orientation and self-interest, the very nature of human thought can induce judges
to make consistent and predictable mistakes in particular situations.‖ Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the
Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 780 (2001). For a recent consideration of the psychology
of judging, see THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING (David Klein & Gregory Mitchell
eds., 2010).
69. 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
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In short, the Constitution does not mean the same thing for all accused of
crime but, rather, varies depending upon the venue. Surely, this is neither an
intended nor a desirable feature of the federal nature of American
government. It suggests that the Supreme Court should do more to reign in its
judicial inferiors, whether conceived of as members of a judicial team or as
judicial agents. Taking more than a handful of cases from the state courts,
thereby providing more guidance to the lower courts and ensuring greater
uniformity, would be a good first step.

Table 170
U.S. Supreme Court Precedent Mentions Per Fact, 1949–198171
Fact
Silence Warning
Attorney Warning
Psychological Coercion
Miranda Warnings
Length of Interrogation
Incommunicado Detention
Magistrate Hearing
Intelligence
Procedural Fairness

Number of Cases
Mentioned72
32
32
28
27
25
23
19
17
17

Percentage of Cases
56
56
49
47
44
40
33
30
30

70. Benesh & Martinek, supra note 8, at 117.
71. Because the Supreme Court decided only ten confession cases in the time span we consider
here, we offer this generalized portrait of the Court’s decision making in this area of law.
72. Cases in which the Supreme Court either mentioned the fact as present or not present.
Presumably, each mention should influence the lower courts to at least consider the fact.
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Request for Attorney Denied
Had No Attorney
Deprived of Basic Needs
Police Relays
Physical Coercion
Minority Race
Mental Illness/Deficiency
Experience with Law
Length of Detention
Mitigating Circumstances
Youth
Other Characteristics
Fruit of Illegality
Prior Coerced Confession
Place of Detention
Waiver of Miranda Rights
Volunteered Information
Harmless Error
Co-Defendant Confession
Place of Interrogation
Total Mentions: 408

17
16
16
15
14
14
11
11
10
10
9
9
7
6
5
4
4
4
3
3
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30
28
28
26
25
25
19
19
17
18
16
16
12
11
9
7
7
7
5
5
Facts Per Case: 7

Table 273
State Supreme Court Comparison Mentions Per Fact, 1970–1981
Fact
Miranda Warnings
Attorney Warning
Silence Warning
Psychological Coercion
Waiver of Miranda Rights
Procedural Fairness
Had No Attorney
Request for Attorney Denied
Physical Coercion
Youth
Fruit of Illegality

Number of Cases
Mentioned74
378
243
233
223
192
141
108
96
94
74
66

Percentage of Cases
84
54
52
49
43
31
24
22
21
16
15

73. Benesh & Martinek, supra note 8, at 120.
74. Cases in which the state supreme court either mentioned the fact as present or not present.
Presumably, each mention should influence the lower courts to at least consider the fact.
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Magistrate Hearing
Mitigating Circumstances
Mental Illness/Deficiency
Deprived of Basic Needs
Length of Interrogation
Volunteered Information
Intelligence
Other Characteristics
Incommunicado Detention
Experience with Law
Co-Defendant Confession
Place of Detention
Length of Detention
Harmless Error
Prior Coerced Confession
Minority Race
Police Relays
Place of Interrogation
Total Mentions: 2,354

60
59
48
45
43
41
41
38
34
21
19
15
15
10
7
4
3
3

819

13
13
11
10
10
9
9
9
8
5
4
3
3
2
2
1
1
1
Facts Per Case: 5

Table 375
U.S. Court of Appeals Comparison Mentions Per Fact, 1970–1981
Fact
Silence Warning
Attorney Warning
Miranda Warnings
Waiver of Miranda Rights
Psychological Coercion
Procedural Fairness
Mitigating Circumstances
Magistrate Hearing
Physical Coercion
Other Characteristics
Request for Attorney Denied
Fruit of Illegality

Number of Cases
Mentioned76
274
271
247
145
127
122
85
83
66
62
61
57

Percentage of Cases
86
85
78
45
40
38
27
26
21
20
19
18

75. BENESH, supra note 1.
76. Cases in which the circuit court either mentioned the fact as present or not present.
Presumably, each mention should influence the lower courts to at least consider the fact.
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Length of Interrogation
Intelligence
Had No Attorney
Incommunicado Detention
Volunteered Information
Deprived of Basic Needs
Youth
Mental Illness/Deficiency
Experience with Law
Harmless Error
Minority Race
Length of Detention
Prior Coerced Confession
Police Relays
Co-Defendant Confession
Place of Interrogation
Place of Detention
Total Mentions: 1,981

44
40
39
32
30
30
30
25
23
21
15
11
11
11
9
6
4
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14
13
12
10
10
9
9
8
7
7
5
4
3
3
3
2
1
Facts Per Case: 6

Table 4
Circuits and States and Supreme Court Precedent
(Robust Standard Errors)
U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals
Variables

Supreme Court Precedent
Coercion
Characteristics of the
Accused
Procedural Issues
Precedent Change
Ideology
U.S. Supreme Court Mean
Segal/Cover
Percent Democrat on Panel
Controls
Lower Court Excluded

Coefficients

Significance Levels
(two-tailed)

1.3299
1.5084

0.001
0.000

0.5180
0.0821

0.000
0.813

-4.5046

0.097

0.7770

0.350

2.2655

0.000
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Confession
Case Involved Murder or
Manslaughter
Constant

821

-0.6621

0.337

-1.9295

0.049

Pseudo R2 = 0.5835; Percent Correctly Classified = 91.59%; Reduction in Error = 49%
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State Courts of Last Resort
Variables

Supreme Court Precedent
Coercion
Characteristics of the
Accused
Procedural Issues
Precedent Change
Ideology
U.S. Supreme Court Mean
Segal/Cover
Mean PAJID Score of
Majority
Controls
Lower Court Excluded
Confession
Case Involved Murder or
Manslaughter
Constant

Coefficients

Significance Levels
(two-tailed)

1.5687
0.6825

0.000
0.000

0.2655
0.0142

0.000
0.964

-0.8384

0.691

0.0279

0.007

0.1330

0.854

-0.4001

0.185

-1.3703

0.098

Pseudo R2 = 0.3431; Percent Correctly Classified = 86.28%; Reduction in Error = 31%
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Table 5
Putting State Court Decision Making in Context
(Robust Standard Errors)
Variables

Supreme Court Precedent
Coercion
Characteristics of the
Accused
Procedural Issues
Precedent Change
Ideology
U.S. Supreme Court Mean
Segal/Cover
Mean PAJID of Majority
Context
Grounds for Decision
Constitution Protective
Constitutional Grounds
Jurisdiction
Intermediate Appellate
Court
State Ideology
Controls
Lower Court Excluded
Confession
Case Involved Murder or
Manslaughter

Coefficients

Significance Levels
(two-tailed)

1.6543
0.6230

0.000
0.002

0.2505
0.1065

0.001
0.735

-0.5721

0.783

0.0138

0.266

0.1894
-0.0403
0.1429
0.4628
0.1867

0.370
0.840
0.640
0.077
0.592

0.0200

0.061

0.3080

0.693

-0.5266

0.085

Constant
-2.6643
0.008
Pseudo R2 = 0.3620; Percent Correctly Classified = 86.89%; Reduction in Error = 34%
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Table 6
The Influence of Supreme Court Precedent

All variables at mean
Three more coercive than
noncoercive facts
Three fewer coercive than
noncoercive facts
Three more sympathetic
accused characteristics
Three fewer sympathetic
accused characteristics
Three more procedural
problems than procedural
protections
Three fewer procedural
problems than procedural
protections
All variables at mean
Three more coercive than
noncoercive facts
Three fewer coercive than
noncoercive facts
Three more sympathetic
accused characteristics
Three fewer sympathetic
accused characteristics
Three more procedural
problems than procedural
protections
Three fewer procedural
problems than procedural
protections

Probability Y = 1
Confession Excluded
(Confidence Interval)
U.S. Courts of Appeals
0.044
(0.017, 0.092)
0.783
(0.334, 0.978)
0.004
(0.000, 0.026)
0.756
(0.403, 0.952)
0.001
(0.000, 0.005)

Change from Mean

+ 0.739
- 0.040
+ 0.712
- 0.043

0.393
(0.199, 0.613)

+ 0.349

0.031
(0.010, 0.069)

- 0.013

State Supreme Courts
0.087
(0.057, 0.124)
0.962
(0.894, 0.992)
0.003
(0.001, 0.010)
0.419
(0.182, 0.693)
0.014
(0.003, 0.041)

+ 0.875
- 0.084
+ 0.332
- 0.079

0.300
(0.156, 0.494)

+ 0.213

0.077
(0.049, 0.112)

- 0.010

